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1. Introduction1 
 
International governmental organisations are playing a greater role in policy-making 
today than ever before (Barnett/Finnemore 2004; Biermann/Siebenhüner 2009). 
Resolving climate change, combating transnational terrorism, fostering democratic 
practices and human rights, fighting contagious diseases, providing stability on the 
financial market, establishing fair rules for international trade, channelling migration – 
few decisions with significance for the future of our societies are taken without the 
involvement of international organisations. The more the activities of international 
organisations encompass day-to-day policy-making tasks, the more urgent becomes 
the question as to who it actually is within these organisations that collects 
information, analyses problems, designs solutions, prepares decisions, supervises 
implementation and sometimes even adjudicates conflicts.  
 
The answer to this question places officials in international bureaucracies at centre 
stage. One of the reasons that justifies the new interest in international civil servants 
is structural,2 because the context in which international bureaucrats usually operate 
(and especially the lack of close parliamentary scrutiny and party-political checks) 
appears to leave them greater room for manoeuvre than their national colleagues. 
The greater one believes that international bureaucracies‟ autonomy has become, 
the more interesting become the bureaucrats operating in such international 
                                                 
1
 This article draws on data collected as part of the “European Commission in Question” (EUCIQ) 
project, which is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant no. RES-062-23-1188) 
and conducted by Hussein Kassim, John Peterson, Michael W. Bauer, Renaud Dehousse, Liesbet 
Hooghe and Andrew Thompson. For further information, please visit 
http://www.uea.ac.uk/psi/research/EUCIQ. I am grateful to Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt, Jörn Ege, 
Morten Egeberg, Francesca Gains, Didier Georgakakis, Liesbet Hooghe, Fabrice Larat, Michaël 
Tatham and Jarle Trondal for comments on earlier versions of this paper, as well as to two anonymous 
referees and the editor of Governance. I am indebted to Philipp Studinger for invaluable assistance 
with the statistical analysis and to Niamh Warde for language editing. 
2
 The discussion should be qualified as “new” because an “older” literature on international civil 
servants also exists: see Hammarskjöld 1961 and Phelan 1933, or Weiss 1982 for further references. 
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structures. A second reason for focusing on international civil servants has to do with 
our concern for the elites that govern or help to govern us (Aberbach et al. 1981; 
Aberbach/Rockman 2006; Putnam 1976). With respect to international civil servants, 
it is often argued that they are highly competitive as well as creative individuals and 
that they are “critical players in multilateral decision-making” (Yi-Chong/Weller 2008: 
50). Thus, if it is true that a growing multinational bureaucratic elite is involved in an 
ever broader range of governance tasks, an understanding of the conditions under 
which these international civil servants are able to influence policy-making and of 
what drives their bureaucratic behaviour both become highly relevant research 
questions.3 
 
Despite their apparent importance, we actually have little systematic knowledge 
about what motivates international bureaucrats, whether they have working ethics or 
attitudes that differ from those of the staff of national administrations, and what 
implications their motivational characteristics may have for international governance 
– either with a view of policy-making or to organisational change. 
 
This article tackles some of these questions about multinational bureaucratic 
motivation. It does so by analysing the attitudes of officials of the European 
Commission – the European Union‟s central administrative body – towards 
organisational change. The Commission appears to be a good place to start 
investigating international bureaucrats‟ motivations because, in comparative terms, 
the Commission is the most independent among the international organisations 
(Haftel/Thompson 2006: 260ff.). If it is worthwhile knowing more about what 
systematically drives international bureaucrats‟ behaviour, Commission civil servants 
                                                 
3
 See further references to this debate in Liese/Weinlich 2006, Mouritzen 1990 and Yi-Chong/Weller 
2008; for critical accounts, see Johns 2007, Weiss 1982 or Vaubel et al. 2007. 
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– because of the potential relevance of their actions given the objective importance of 
the organisation they are working for – are one of the first groups to turn to.4 
 
Specifically, the causes behind bureaucratic attitudes towards organisational change 
shall be analyzed. In the early 2000s, the European Commission underwent the 
largest organisational reform ever in its history. A 2006 survey found that only a small 
fraction of the Commission‟s managers welcomed the administrative modernisation, 
while the vast majority turned out to be unambiguous opponents of what is known as 
the “Kinnock reform” (Bauer 2008). After five years of operations under the new rules 
and procedures, the Commission staff still appears to be split in its assessment of the 
reform.5 
 
The question, then, is how can one explain the individual attitudes of Commission 
officials towards organisational change. More precisely, why and when does staff 
accept or oppose the recent management modernisation within the European 
Commission? Answers may come from standard conceptualisations of the behaviour 
of Commission officials. They are frequently described as cunning “idealists” or even 
“ideologues” of the European integration process, always pushing for policy solutions 
to the benefit of supranational actors (Cram 1993; Haas 1958; Héritier 1997). Other 
accounts underline the effects of multinational staffing, where language confusion 
and diverse cultural heritages pose problems for internal coordination (Abélès et al. 
1993; Bellier 2000; Michelmann 1978; Shore 2007). As I will show below, however, in 
                                                 
4
 Today the European Commission has a staff of more than 40,000; more than the half of these 
(20,023) are regular officials, who are the empirical focus of this article. See Table 5 in the Appendix.  
5
 As late as 2009, in a round of face-to-face interviews with top managers of the Commission, there is 
a broad spectrum of opinions ranging from “the Kinnock reform has been a success” and “the 
Commission has done an enormous job in reforming itself” to more gloomy positions such as “we have 
been overshooting” and the “effects for the organisation are disastrous”. Out of 45 fully transcribed 
interviews, 9 can be rated as very critical, 14 as critical, 12 as neutral, 7 as approving and 0 as very 
approving, while 3 did not give an assessment or were not asked to. 
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the case of administrative reform, rather than pro-European “ideology” or “national 
socialisation”, the driving force behind bureaucratic motivation among European civil 
servants actually follows a logic of utility maximisation. Even intensive administrative 
change is welcome if the calculable consequences are positive for the individual.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. Following this introduction, the Kinnock reform will be 
briefly described (Section 2). I will then develop three competing explanations of staff 
acceptance (opportunity, socialisation, EU ideology) and their empirical implications 
(Section 3). Section 4 describes the research design, and Section 5 contains the 
empirical analysis, which is based on a simple statistical model using data from a 
recent attitudinal survey of Commission officials. The conclusion attempts to place 
the results in a broader theoretical and empirical context (Section 6).  
 
2. The Kinnock Reform 
 
The unprecedented resignation of the European Commission under allegations of 
fraud and mismanagement led to a comprehensive overhaul of the body‟s internal 
management procedures between 1999 and 2004.6 This reform – named after the 
responsible vice-president Neil Kinnock – consisted of four crucial issues: personnel, 
strategic planning and programming, financial management, and transparency and 
ethics (Barzelay/Jacobsen 2009; Bauer 2007, 2008; Bearfield 2004; Ellinas/Suleiman 
2008, 2011; Kassim 2004a,b, 2008; Metcalfe 2000; Levy 2006). 
 
                                                 
6
 The major changes were implemented between 2000 and 2004, but the Commission was still busy 
coping with reform leftovers during the period 2004 to 2009 and even started some re-reforming 
(especially in the area of staff appraisal; see Ban 2008, 2010). 
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The reform changed the Commission from a melange between Roman-German and 
Roman-French-style bureaucracy (characterised by input management and a strict 
division of labour, cf. Balint et al. 2008) into an administration moving towards 
(although not completely achieving) a New Public Management style that features 
pluriannual planning, increased vertical and horizontal coordination, and an output 
focus. More emphasis was put on visible, hands-on top management, as well as on 
performance indicators and audit, with the ultimate aim of enabling top-down 
management. In effect, the efficiency and resource-for-results focus actually 
intensified the need for internal coordination and central leadership (Balint et al. 
2008; Pollitt/Bouckaert 2004; Schön-Quinlivan 2008).7 
 
Take Strategic Planning and Programming (SPP) – one of the cornerstones of the 
reform. SPP means strategic priority-setting (on the basis of updated information 
about what exactly is done in the Commission and by whom), corresponding 
resource allocation, process monitoring, ex-post evaluation and – inherently related 
to these – adequate redistribution of financial and personnel resources on the basis 
of a programming cycle stretching over several years.  
 
The SPP cycle is indeed a challenge. The means and needs have to be justified in 
the light of the targeted objectives. A detailed Annual Policy Strategy (APS) is 
drafted, discussed and agreed upon through a process that involves virtually all the 
layers of the internal administration in a huge communication and coordination 
                                                 
7
 New Public Management is not a uniform model, rather more of a “theme” on management reform of 
the public sector (Pollitt/Bouckaert 2004). Christopher Hood describes its core features as “the idea of 
a shift in emphasis from policy making to management skills, from a stress on process to a stress on 
output, from orderly hierarchies to an intendedly more competitive basis for providing public services, 
from fixed to variable pay and from a uniform and inclusive public service to a variant structure with 
more emphasis on contract provision” (Hood 1995: 94). In the strict sense, the Commission variant is 
therefore not a full-fledged NPM reform because it maintains a robust hierarchy and also a strong 
focus on process. 
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exercise. The APS is translated into mission statements and work programmes for 
each Commission service and sets out specific objectives for directorates and units. 
In response, each DG or service requires Annual Activity Reports that include 
strategic evaluations of activities, expenditure and so forth up and down the hierarchy 
(Kassim 2004a: 48). Tasks like producing proposals for policy objectives, conceiving 
(measurable) progress and quality indicators, conducting impact assessment 
exercises, suggesting priorities, drafting corresponding reporting notes, and 
evaluating and communicating decisions back to the units and to staff together mean 
– at the very least – that all layers of staff in the Commission have to cope with 
intensive change.  
 
The personnel area constitutes another centrepiece of the modernisation plan, given 
that budgeting, programming and coordination aspects have personnel implications 
and vice versa. The “linearisation” of careers, i.e. fewer obstacles to switching 
between staff categories and the proliferation of more but smaller promotion steps on 
the individual career ladder, as well as the new pension regime, were among the 
most contested issues (Bauer 2007; Kassim 2004a,b). The aims were to keep staff 
motivated until very late in their individual careers and to keep the costs for salaries 
and pensions in check.  
 
Both in the area of personnel management and in the context of strategic planning or 
financial management modernisation, the Commission has changed from input- to 
output-style management. The top management is empowered to vertically set 
priorities and to monitor (and intervene, if necessary) early on in horizontal 
coordination and in the entire administrative policy-production process. This also 
means that lower layers in the hierarchy have to provide (much more rigorously than 
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in the past) the necessary information in a continuous and comprehensive way in 
order to enable senior managers to analyse, assess and potentially intervene with 
greater precision and effect.  
 
In sum, the recent managerial reform in the Commission was both comprehensive 
and controversial and affected in a practical sense all the individuals working in the 
institution. A change of this magnitude is unlikely to leave public servants indifferent, 
given that they have to cope with the impact of change extensively in their day-to-day 
working lives.  
 
3. Explaining Individual Attitudes to Organisational Change 
 
To produce positive results, organisational change requires the personnel of an 
organisation to support it. Little or no acceptance of organisational change by huge 
parts of the personnel endangers not only the “success” of certain reforms, but in the 
medium- and long-term perspective even the survival of the organisation itself (Simon 
1997: 144).  
 
The question as to how and why staff oppose or endorse organisational change is 
thus of practical and theoretical importance. The Kinnock reform represented a 
landmark change for the Commission and its personnel. The question, then, is how – 
in the concrete case of the European Commission as an international administration 
– to theorise the potential relationship between individual Commission staff and 
management change. Which theoretical approaches allow us to derive systematic 
expectations about individual attitudes towards organisational change?  
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There is a rich tradition of studying what can be summarised as the belief systems of 
political elites. While international civil servants have not received much attention in 
research to date (but see Hooghe 2001 and Trondal 2010), national administrators, 
government leaders, party leaders and European parliamentarians have been 
studied quite intensively (Converse 1964; Derlien 1996; Hix 2002; Lau/Sears 1986).8 
 
With respect to the question as to what explains the belief systems of political elites, 
there are two classical positions, one resting on economic theory and the mechanism 
of utility maximisation, the other on sociology and the mechanism of group dynamics, 
usually summed up as socialisation. Given their ontological origins, these two 
positions appear difficult to reconcile. Indeed, they have been set in sharp conflict 
with each other, i.e. as theoretical competitors, in order to explain individual attitudes. 
Currently, however, research informed by political psychology and neurobiology, 
among other disciplines, questions the usefulness of such a concept of mutual 
exclusivity (Checkel 2005; Mansbridge 1990; Sears 1993; Sears/Funk 1991; 
Zürn/Checkel 2005).9 Researchers are thus starting to work on refining the classical 
positions (utility maximisation and socialisation) with a view to discovering ways to 
bridge the ontological gap between self-interest and social explanations (Hooghe 
2001, 2005).  
                                                 
8
 In the case of public officials, who are at the focus of this study, the rule of thumb is that the closer 
they are to the political sphere, the greater becomes the academic interest in their individual 
dispositions, social backgrounds, education, career paths and political attitudes (Aberbach et al. 1981; 
Aberbach/Rockman 2006). 
9
 I confine my analysis to perspectives based on debates in political science and public administration. 
There are, however, studies in organisational sociology and organisational psychology that could 
contribute to the issue (for overviews of current debates, see Cunningham et al. 2002; 
Herscovitch/Meyer 2002; Piderit 2000). Organisational sociologists and psychologists attempt to 
explain general “readiness” for (any kind of) organisational or programme change on the basis of 
macro-organisational structures or micro-level, general individual dispositions (for example, job 
satisfaction or active/passive approaches to job problem-solving). The empirical objects of these 
studies are, as far as I can see, usually street-level bureaucrats working at the implementation level 
rather than elite officials working in policy planning (the focus of this study). Moreover, change is 
usually conceived as issue specific (policy content or specific procedures in the production of a 
particular service) rather than as a fundamental organisational shift such as the Kinnock reform. 
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Such “bridge” concepts are “cues”, “reference systems” or “intellectual shortcuts” that 
can be conceived of as (relatively) stable ideological dispositions (Anderson 1998; 
Hooghe/Marks 2005). These have recently been put forward in order to explain 
preference patterns that have not as yet been made sense of by the dichotomy 
between self-interest and social embeddedness. I now turn to the development of the 
competing implications of each of these three explanatory programmes with the aim 
of explaining individual attitudes towards the Kinnock reform. 
 
Opportunity 
 
What I understand under the term “opportunity” is the core of “utility maximisation”. 
Accordingly, the formation of preferences is subject to an individual cost-benefit 
calculation. As soon as opportunity structures change, individual preferences adapt 
to the altered circumstances (“logic of consequentiality”; see March/Olsen 1989: 
160f.). The point, however, is that whatever the exogenous change, it should be 
perceived to have (concrete and relatively easily) identifiable consequences for the 
individual. In our case, the implication of an organisational reform for the “wellbeing” 
of an individual should lie in the professional opportunity structure it creates or, more 
precisely, it should be crucial whether organisational change is perceived as 
advantageous or disadvantageous for the job itself or for the career prospects of an 
individual.  
 
The Kinnock reform produces and redistributes “professional” costs and benefits 
vertically. Put simply, the higher one‟s position in the hierarchy, the more positive one 
should feel about the reform. The reason is that, according to the logic introduced by 
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the Kinnock reform, managerial information has to be painfully produced at lower 
levels and then transported upwards in order to serve as the basis for improved 
organisational decision-making at the top. Although some of the rank and file see the 
new process as giving them a clearer understanding of the goals of their part of the 
organisation and of the expectations regarding their own performance, in general 
officials at lower echelons (middle management and lower) “pay the price” in terms of 
more coordination and more information production; top managers enjoy greater 
steering capacity because they have an apparently improved informational basis for 
their policy decisions. A similar argument can be made with respect to the 
redistribution of power among DGs and services. Moreover, given that the Kinnock 
reform restructures the entire career advancement system, people who feel 
disadvantaged by the new ways of doing things are unlikely to have much sympathy 
for the recent organisational changes.10 
 
Opportunity hypotheses 
 
Given that the administrative reform redistributes the costs and benefits of 
organisational change vertically and also affects individuals‟ career advancement, a 
first, twofold hypothesis thus focuses on hierarchical rank (H1 middle manager and 
H2 senior manager) and expects the following: the higher an individual stands 
vertically in the hierarchy, the greater will be his or her acceptance of the reform. The 
reform also creates a new planning logic which gives greater powers to “steering” 
Directorates-General like DG Budget, Internal Audit and the Secretariat-General. 
Thus, officials working for the latter units should endorse the reform more than their 
colleagues in other DGs (H3 DG type). A fourth hypothesis puts individuals‟ 
                                                 
10
 Recently, management change studies have also begun to highlight factors such as unfairness and 
perception of mistreatment as causes behind resistance to change; see Folger/Skarlicki 1999. 
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perception as to whether their individual career is helped or hindered at centre stage: 
those who are convinced that their own career advancement has been negatively 
affected should demonstrate lower acceptance of the reform than those who see no 
such connection (H4 career prospects). 
 
Socialisation 
 
Sociology and psychology view the formation of preferences as an endogenous 
process. The core assumption is that individuals develop preferences by internalising 
norms and values from their social environment – often early on in their lives 
(Converse 1964; Johnston 2001; Loveless/Rohrschneider 2008; Rohrschneider 
1994; Wildawsky 1987). The mechanism at work is usually conceived of as 
“socialisation”. Socialisation is frequently equated with “group dynamic” effects, i.e. 
the way in which the norms and values of the in-group are adopted by a (new) 
individual. Often the “intake” of norms is thought to work automatically, especially in 
the formative years (social class, particular university education, particular discipline 
– e.g., if an individual is trained as a economist – etc.) (Checkel 2005, 2007; 
Zürn/Checkel 2005).  
 
Applying this approach to our research question, one can argue, for example, that 
new public management reforms have come to be implemented first and most 
intensively in the UK and in northern Europe. Thus, Commission officials from these 
countries may have had the opportunity during their formative years to become 
familiar with crucial elements of this type of organisational concept, with the result 
that they can accept it more easily than officials who come from an “NPM laggard” 
country. The point here is that those who have previously been in contact with certain 
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kinds of change or the rhetoric surrounding such change may indeed demonstrate 
less opposition to it. The Kinnock reform imports (to some extent) concepts from 
business administration into Commission management. Accordingly, one should find 
that those officials with experience in the private sector are more in favour of the 
reform than those who have never worked outside public administration. In short, 
those individuals who have had the chance to learn how to handle NPM types of 
change should have fewer problems applying them within the Commission. 
 
Socialisation hypotheses 
 
A first socialisation hypothesis thus focuses on the relationship between national 
administrative traditions and individual reform attitudes. Because the modernisation 
of national public sectors has been pursued more intensively in some countries than 
in others, individuals from those countries that have embraced NPM reforms are also 
likely to endorse the Kinnock reform; the opposite is to be expected from individuals 
from NPM laggard countries (H5 administrative tradition). 
 
A second set of hypotheses expects that work experience in the private sector or 
professional training in economics will heighten reform enthusiasm. The Kinnock 
modernisation is a mild variant of an NPM reform; professional experience in the 
private sector or training as an economist will have made an individual more familiar 
with similar management devices and cultures, and thus such individuals should 
endorse the Kinnock reform more than others who did not have the chance to learn 
to handle and apply private management rules and procedures (H6 work experience 
in private sector and H7 economist).  
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EU Ideology 
 
Utility maximisation and socialisation attempt to establish a direct intellectual or 
practical link between a particular stimulus and an individual. However, “indirect” or 
“intermediate” factors may also be at work. The argument is that (“normal”, rationally 
bounded) individuals (with limited resources) turn to “proxies”, “cues” or “heuristics” 
as intellectual shortcuts in order to position themselves with respect to new features 
in their environment (Anderson 1998; Hooghe/Marks 2009; Simon 1997).  
 
For example, whether or not somebody likes the actual process of European 
unification can be conceived of as a function of his or her conviction on a continuum 
between market liberalism and social interventionism. Against the background of this 
general proposition, Liesbet Hooghe examined whether Commission top officials‟ 
convictions as supranationalists or intergovernmentalists changed in accordance with 
the time they had spent working for the Commission, i.e. whether a kind of 
socialisation towards “supranationalism” takes place among individuals who work in 
the Commission (Hooghe 2001). Her answer is “rather not“ (Hooghe 2001, 2005). 
Hooghe appears to have thus produced evidence that the crucial question about the 
finalité of the European Union (EU) is usually answered on the basis of relatively 
stable ideological dispositions that the officials “bring with them“ and that “stay with 
them“ throughout their careers. There may be some kind of selection bias when 
Commission personnel are recruited (Europhile Commission officials recruit other 
Europhile candidates). However, there is only weak evidence that officials change 
their views on the EU as a result of their working within the European Commission.11 
                                                 
11
 Hooghe‟s truncated sample, the lack of panel data, the confounding influence of other factors, etc., 
make it very hard to prove the presence or absence of socialisation in any definitive way. In her 2005 
article, Hooghe highlights the rapidly changing political and organisational environment as another 
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Officials thus appear to stick to their convictions with regard to their personal 
preferred governance order for the EU regardless of the fact that they are actually 
employed by an institution that obviously has a particular organisational interest in 
this issue. Against this background, I argue that one can use (stable) dispositions 
about the preferred governance structure of the EU (intergovernmental or 
supranational) as a shortcut for predicting Commission officials‟ attitudes to 
management change. In order to underline the specific character of the mechanism 
at work, I call this approach “EU ideology”, because it is the political preference 
regarding the future of the EU that delivers the “cue” or “heuristic” for assessing 
management change.  
 
The supranationalist narrative is that the Commission has been purposely weakened 
by the Kinnock reform. Supranationalists mourn the era of Jacques Delors and the 
then pro-active Commission and equate the Kinnock reform with a weakening of the 
institution and with the loss of its “original mission”. The Kinnock reform is portrayed 
as a perfidious strategy of deliberate over-bureaucratisation that seeks to paralyse 
the Commission and distract staff from engaging in integrationist projects 
(Georgakakis 2010; Kassim 2004a,b).12 Intergovernmentalists can be expected to 
have a different view. They are in favour of an “instrumental” Commission that sees 
its function in good management, not in policy entrepreneurship aimed at bringing 
about a federal Europe. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
factor: institutions in flux are never fertile ground for socialisation since the cues they provide are in 
flux as well (I am grateful to Liesbet for pointing this out to me). 
12
 This is a view that is widely held within the Commissions‟ staff unions (Georgakakis 2007). As 
interview data from 2006 show, those who conceive of European integration as a project in need of a 
strong, independent and shrewd supranational agent fear that the Kinnock reform means that the 
Commission will lose its “political duties”, “political priorities” and “political function” and that the 
“original mission [has been] forgotten”. Furthermore: “Before the reform managers were experts in 
their domain, now they are only managers”. The quotations are taken from Bauer 2008, p. 700. 
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EU Ideology hypotheses 
 
The ideology hypotheses expect that individuals who lean towards supranationalism 
as their preferred model for the future European political order will exhibit rather low 
acceptance of the recent administrative changes within the Commission. Because 
the supranational logic of integration favours strong European institutions, and 
because the administrative reform has been interpreted as a weakening of the 
Commission (Bauer 2008), supranationalists should thus have little sympathy for 
administrative reform, while intergovernmentalists may well like it for the same 
reason (H8 supranationalism). 
 
Accordingly, those officials who see the mission of the Commission in furthering 
European unification with the help of integrationist projects (according to a neo-
functionalist logic) will show little support for the recent administrative changes (H9 
entrepreneurs). Finally, those who entered the Commission on the basis of idealism 
for the unification project usually see the mission of the Commission as advancing 
and fostering European integration and – similar to the logic of the supranationalist 
argument – therefore have misgivings if the Commission as Commission focuses 
more on organisational management than on systemic advancement. EU idealists 
should therefore oppose rather than welcome the Kinnock reform (H10 EU idealism). 
 
Table 1: Explanatory Approaches and Hypotheses13 
Approach Variable Hypothesis 
Opportunity 
hypotheses 
H1 Middle manager The higher the rank, the greater the reform acceptance 
H2 Senior manager The higher the rank, the greater the reform acceptance 
H3 DG Type  Working in DGs assumed to benefit from the reform should 
lead to greater reform acceptance 
H4 Career prospects If there is a perception of recent unfair career management 
within the Commission, then low reform acceptance
14
 
                                                 
13
 More information about the hypotheses, including coding, can be found in the Appendix. 
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Socialisation 
hypotheses 
H5 Administrative 
traditions 
Individuals from NPM forerunner countries like the reform, 
those from NPM laggards dislike the reform  
H6 Experience in 
private sector 
Work experience in the private sector should lead to greater 
reform acceptance 
H7 Economists Education in economics should lead to greater reform 
acceptance 
EU Ideology 
hypotheses 
H8 Supranationalism Supranationalists should exhibit lower reform acceptance 
H9 Entrepreneur Those who see the goals of the Commission in 
entrepreneurship for integration should exhibit low reform 
acceptance 
H10 EU Idealism EU idealists should exhibit low reform acceptance 
 
4. Research Design 
 
Opportunity, socialisation and EU ideology are three approaches to explaining staff 
acceptance of recent administrative change. Before proceeding with their statistical 
analysis, however, I will first describe the data source and the specification of the 
dependent variable.  
 
The data stem from an attitudinal survey of Commission officials.15 A total of 4,621 
administrative (AD) staff were sampled (disproportionate stratified random sample), 
of whom 1,901 completed the survey (response rate 41%).16 The questionnaire 
                                                                                                                                                        
14
 Please note that the data allows us to make only an indirect connection between the individual‟s 
assessment of his/her career prospects and the individual‟s support for the Kinnock reform because 
the assessment of career prospects was asked for in the survey in the context of the effects of recent 
enlargements. 
15
 The survey is called EUCIQ. It was carried out in September 2008 as an online, self-completion 
questionnaire (random sample) among career officials of the European Commission (Category I, see 
Table 5 in the Appendix). It was ensured that the sample is representative of seniority, gender, age, 
length of service, nationality (in particular EU15/EU12 proportions) and Directorates-General (31 
policy-related DGs). The EUCIQ team is dedicated to studying the European Commission as an 
organisation in the governance context of the European Union of today. The initial sample included all 
senior staff with managerial responsibility, i.e. heads of unit upward (n=1766) and a random sample of 
non-managerial staff in 31 DGs (n=2855). The initial sample was intentionally disproportionate for 
EU15 (75%) and EU12 (25%), i.e. the EU12 was “oversampled” so as to make sure there would be 
enough individuals in the final data (at the time the survey was conducted, just 12% of Commission 
officials came from EU12 countries). Sampling was done with the help of DG Admin, while YouGov – a 
UK polling firm – managed the online survey. The final sample was (re-)weighted so as to reflect the 
real population distribution. In addition, after the closure of the online survey, the EUCIQ team 
conducted two kinds of follow-up face-to-face interviews. A total of 60 respondents out of a group of 
124 were interviewed in spring 2009 on the basis of a semi-structured questionnaire. These had 
indicated in the online survey that they would be open to follow-up questions (self-selection). 
Moreover, 5 Commissioners, 28 cabinet members, and 45 senior managers and middle managers 
were interviewed in summer 2009.  
16
 The total target population is 14,730 policy-related (i.e., no translators, etc.) AD staff based in the 
Directorates-General and other services of the European Commission in Brussels and Luxembourg. 
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consisted of about 30 mainly “closed” questions (with a considerable number of sub-
questions) on backgrounds, role perceptions, attitudes towards European integration, 
internal operations, networks, effects of enlargement and impact of management 
reform. Note that for the present analysis I excluded officials that entered the 
Commission after the year 2000, which basically means that no individuals from 
Eastern European countries and from Malta and Cyprus (except for double 
nationality) are included in the data set. The reason is that the questions about 
administrative reform seek to compare the new status quo with the status quo ante, 
and newcomers are therefore not in a position to answer them. Subtracting those 
individuals who did not answer all the relevant questions (problem of missing 
answers), the sample size for the present analysis is n=707. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The basis of the dependent variable is a battery of questions in the EUCIQ survey 
concerning individuals‟ assessment of the impact of recent administrative change 
within the Commission. The general question was “We would like to ask your views 
on recent administrative reforms. Thinking of the administrative reforms implemented 
since 2000, what are your views on the following statements?” The stimuli conceived 
for fleshing out this general question were, for example, “I have become more 
efficient in my day-to-day work”, “My unit/service has become more efficient”, 
“Resources are better matched to policy priorities”, “The new tools and rules reduce 
red tape and administrative load”, and “Personnel management has become leaner 
and more focused”.  
                                                                                                                                                        
This means that only “functionaries” are included in the sample, while temporary agents and staff on 
secondment, as well as the staff in the EU‟s missions abroad, were excluded, see table 5 in the 
Appendix. 
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With the help of principal component analysis (PCA), the dependent variable was 
constructed out of these seven questions, which all explore the assessment of the 
recent administrative reform. The PCA shows that all seven variables load to one 
factor. Their values can thus be extracted and interpreted as a single dependent 
variable indicating the general attitude to the administrative reform. These data 
constitute the dependent variable in the subsequent regression analysis.17 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
Let us start with a look at the dependent variable, i.e. some descriptive statistics 
about the effects of administrative reform. The table below indicates the percentage 
of individuals in the sample who show a positive attitude towards organisational 
change (by agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement of the question), remain 
neutral or show a negative attitude (by disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the 
statement).  
 
[Table 2 about here!] 
 
 
Table 2: Assessment of Kinnock Reform in Percent 
                                                 
17
 For details of the construction of the dependent variable and of the PCA, see the Appendix. 
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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
The new tools and rules reduce red tape and
reduce the administrative load.
The new tools and rules are applied in a non-
formalistic way, which means they have produced
their intended effects.
Resources are better matched to policy priorities.
Personnel management has become leaner and
more focused.
My unit/service has become more efficient.
The general benefits to the house outweigh any
negative effects on me.
I have become more efficient in my day-to-day
work.
negative
neutral
agree
 
Note: Black: negative position towards the administrative reform, dark grey: neutral position; light grey: positive 
attitude. 
 
 
Table 2 shows that with respect to each stimulus the share of negative assessments 
is greater than the share of positive assessments, albeit occasionally by a small 
margin. In four out of the seven stimuli the share of negative assessments is 50% or 
more; the last two items indicate 2/3 to 3/4 majorities of officials who believe that the 
Kinnock reform increased red tape and that the new rules and procedures are 
applied in an overly formalistic way. Table 3 – based on the same data – gives more 
detailed information. Aggregate assessment of the Kinnock reform always remains 
below 2.0 – with 4.0 being the highest possible value of positive assessment. The 
overall mean of the assessment of the Kinnock reform lies at 1.6, and thus 0.4 below 
a purely neutral position, which indicates an unenthusiastic attitude on the part of the 
officials towards organisational change.  
 
[Table 3 about here!] 
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Table 3: Assessment of the Kinnock Reform – Mean and Standard Deviation 
Statement Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum N 
I have become more efficient in my 
day-to-day work. 
1.8 .96 0 4 845 
The general benefits to the house 
outweigh any negative effects on me. 
1.9 1.1 0 4 772 
My unit/service has become more 
efficient. 
1.9 1 0 4 814 
Personnel management has become 
leaner and more focused. 
1.6 1.1 0 4 836 
Resources are better matched to 
policy priorities. 
1.6 1 0 4 829 
The new tools and rules are applied in 
a non-formalistic way, which means 
they have produced their intended 
effects. 
1.3 .91 0 4 832 
The new tools and rules reduce red 
tape and reduce the administrative 
load. 
1.0 .93 0 4 849 
Total* 1.6 .71 0 4 702 
Note: The answer scale ranges from strongly agree (= 4) to strongly disagree (= 0); N = number of 
respondents. * Overall mean value of respondents. 
 
How should one assess the result of a 1.6 mean attitude to the Kinnock reform, i.e. is 
the glass “half empty” or “half full”? Given the available qualitative accounts (Kassim 
2004a,b, Levy 2006) and related quantitative research (Bauer 2008, Ellinas/Suleiman 
2008, 2011), I think it is fair to say that on the basis of the results of these studies one 
would have expected even more hostility towards the Kinnock reform. As time went 
by and officials got used to the new procedures, original high levels of resistance 
decreased towards a more benign, though certainly a positive aggregate 
assessment. 
 
Let us now proceed with the statistical analysis (OLS regression). The opportunity 
variables do well and as expected; senior managers (if compared to more junior 
staff), for example, do approve of the reform more than middle managers and other 
staff – which demonstrates the robustness of the argument that the higher an 
individual‟s position in the hierarchy, the greater the enthusiasm for the Kinnock 
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reform.18 The significant relationship between steering DGs and reform acceptance is 
also impressive: the Secretariat-General, DG Budget and Internal Audit are 
strongholds of reform supporters.19 There is also a clear confirmation that those who 
see their career prospects as being endangered tend to dislike the Kinnock reform. 
The socialisation variables do less well and the ideology variables actually do very 
badly.  
 
Table 4: Regression models: Acceptance of administrative reform 
 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Opportunity   
  
H1   Middle Manager 0.139* 0.162** 
 (0.081) (0.080) 
H2   Senior Manager 0.353** 0.341** 
 (0.143) (0.137) 
H3   DG Type 0.508*** 0.499*** 
 (0.141) (0.138) 
H4   Career Prospects -0.341*** -0.355*** 
 (0.042) (0.041) 
Socialisation   
  
H5   Administrative Traditions 0.221*** 0.209** 
 (0.085) (0.084) 
H6   Work Experience in Private Sector -0.101  
 (0.077)  
H7   Economists 0.203* 0.173* 
 (0.108) (0.095) 
EU Ideology   
  
H8   Supranationalism 0.019  
 (0.042)  
H9   Entrepreneur 0.024  
 (0.032)  
H10 EU Idealism 0.059  
 (0.082)  
Control   
  
Loss of Power for the Commission -0.146*** -0.136*** 
                                                 
18
 One could object that individuals at higher levels of the hierarchy may feel obliged to defend 
organisational decisions because of their greater responsibility for administrative policies and/or their 
proximity to decision-making processes. While carrying out face-to-face interviews with middle and 
senior managers, the EUCIQ team did not experience systematic caution or reservations on the part of 
those individuals at higher levels in the hierarchy. On the contrary, the most frank interview statements 
often came from higher rather than lower ranks. This frankness of top officials has also been 
experienced by others (see Hooghe 2001). So I have no reason to believe that higher ranks 
systematically suppress their negative opinions about reform in favour of demonstrating professional 
loyalty to “their” organisation.  
19
 If we also include DG Administration in this group, the effect disappears. This indicates that officials 
in DG Administration see the reform more critically. This fits my interpretation that the Kinnock reform 
actually empowered DG Budget via the pluriannual financial planning and reduced the internal power 
of DG Administration. 
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 (0.046) (0.045) 
Time of Service -0.018** -0.024*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) 
Lawyers
20
 0.023  
 (0.087)  
Age -0.009  
 (0.007)  
Female -0.065  
 (0.092)  
Constant 1.798*** 1.586*** 
 (0.379) (0.210) 
Observations 554 570 
R-squared 0.24 0.23 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Administrative Traditions comes out strongly, i.e. individuals who are acquainted with 
a certain public managerial culture because they come from a NPM forerunner 
country (the model now applied in the Commission is in various respects similar to 
NPM) are more accepting of the Kinnock reform than officials coming from a NPM 
laggard country. Economists, as expected, are also more likely to support the specific 
administrative change the Commission has engaged in, while work experience in the 
private sector shows no significant coefficient.  
 
None of the EU Ideology factors is significant. Whether individuals lean towards 
supranationalism as the governance model for the EU, whether they prefer an 
entrepreneurial logic of action for the Commission and whether they joined the 
Commission with a pro-integration idealistic impetus does not systematically 
determine their assessment of recent managerial changes within the European 
Commission. 
 
With respect to our control variables, it should be noted that neither being female nor 
a lawyer has a significant impact on the individual‟s position towards administrative 
change. Since a well-known human disposition is that “old habits die hard”, it was to 
                                                 
20
 The category lawyers stands for lawyers, political scientists and engineers, i.e. non-economic-
related education.  
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be expected that “time of service” is mildly significant, i.e. the longer one works inside 
the Commission, the more opposed one is to the Kinnock reform. However one 
should note that individual age is not influential as such, i.e. it is not the “elderly” 
officials per se who oppose recent managerial change, but those who have a longer 
duration of service. There is also a relationship between a diffuse feeling that the 
Commission has recently lost power and support towards the Kinnock reform. One 
can interpret this as meaning that those who are dissatisfied with the role the 
Commission has recently being playing – however diffuse that feeling is – also view 
the recent organisational changes critically. The logic behind this relationship might 
be a generally pessimistic disposition towards any kind of change (and thus also the 
Kinnock reform), so that such discontent would be categorically different to the 
explanatory mechanisms behind the opportunity, socialisation and ideology 
programmes. 
 
Summing up, an individual‟s position in the Commission as an organisation (in terms 
of hierarchy and function), as well as his or her expectation of fair treatment with 
respect to career advancement, are strong predictors for this individual‟s opposition 
to or support for the management reform. Socialisation variables appear to 
complement, but not dominate this picture. The chosen “ideological cues” have no 
relevance whatsoever. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Even after more than a decade of “reforming the European Commission”, 
Commission officials are not actually particularly fond of the management change 
that has been achieved. As our statistical analysis shows, the acceptance levels of 
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the Kinnock reform lean towards the negative. However, the harsh condemnation of 
the Kinnock reform in earlier interpretations based on qualitative studies and 
quantitative research (usually with smaller samples) is not backed by our data (Bauer 
2008; Ellinas/Suleiman 2008; Georgakakis 2010; Kassim 2004a,b; Levy 2006). While 
the pathologies of the reform and the frustration of the staff who have to cope with 
the paradoxes of organisational change are still palpable, the passing of time and the 
establishment of new routines seem to have eased previous worries and 
reservations. Commission officials, however grudgingly, have by now halfway 
accepted the new state of the art in terms of the management culture inside their 
organisation. It thus appears time to “de-dramatise” the Kinnock reforms and to 
acknowledge that a kind of normalisation has taken place with respect to staff and 
their relationship to the recent wave of management changes. Or, in the words of one 
interviewee: “We will have to live with that. We learn to live with that.” 
 
The main question at the centre of this article was not how the Commission officials 
actually assess the Kinnock reform but how to best explain staff attitudes towards 
organisational change in general. Usually, rational or sociological hypotheses are put 
forward in an ad-hoc manner to explain the acceptance of administrative reforms 
within the Commission. As a consequence, little solid empirical (let alone statistical) 
knowledge has so far been available. The main aim was thus to systematically 
deduce hypotheses from three theoretical approaches and to put them to an 
empirical test. Three major implications – regarding evidence, theory advancement 
and prospects for related research, respectively – can thus be drawn from this 
analysis.  
 
 26 
With respect to the evidence produced by the statistical analysis, the main finding is 
that the individual attitudes of Commission officials towards management change can 
best be explained by the opportunity model, which emphasises the rational 
calculation of individual costs and benefits. Hierarchical rank, organisational function 
and expectation of fair career treatment are the best predictors for acceptance of 
management change. Socialisation variables do less well. However, if the 
administrative system of one individual‟s home country has bought into New Public 
Managerialism, this “outside socialisation” increases the likelihood that this individual, 
as a Commission official, will support the Kinnock reform. Education as an economist 
also pushes the official in the direction of a more positive assessment, while work 
experience in the private sector makes no difference. Most interestingly, however, the 
data show very clearly that the acceptance of the reform is not driven by EU ideology. 
Variables that attempt to relate patterns of support or opposition to recent managerial 
reform within the Commission to individual attitudes about the future political order of 
the EU and the role of the Commission therein do badly. Those in favour of a strong, 
entrepreneurial Commission in a federal-like EU do not particularly oppose the 
Kinnock reform (although they were expected to) and neither does having joined the 
Commission as an integration idealist have a systematic impact on an individual‟s 
acceptance of the Kinnock reform.  
 
This evidence has two consequences for theory development concerned with 
explaining international officials‟ bureaucratic motivations, in general, and their 
attitudes towards organisational change, in particular. First, the fact that both 
programmes – opportunity and socialisation – carry explanatory weight supports 
demands for efforts to better understand under which conditions the one does better 
than the other and once more underlines the futility of trying to set utility maximisation 
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and social embeddedness in stark competition with one another. Second, while 
working on “bridging” conceptualisations so as to overcome the utility-socialisation 
dualism may still be the way forward, the intuitively promising conceptualisation of EU 
ideology as a “proxy” for identifying the underlying pattern of support or resistance 
towards organisational change in international bureaucratic environments such as 
the European Commission did not actually turn out to be useful. While party-
ideological positions have proved significant in analyses of national populations 
(Franklin et al. 1994; Hooghe et al. 2002; Weßels 1995), our results call into question 
the value of the cue concept for elites and, in particular, for supranational (and 
therefore culturally extremely heterogeneous) elites. The question of when and under 
which conditions attitudinal cues or proxies work in international constellations should 
be put on the relevant research agendas.  
 
Taking the Commission sample presented as a representative sample for the 
emerging international bureaucratic elite, this elite appears, first and foremost, to be 
immensely professional. Ideological convictions are unlikely to be driving forces 
behind behaviour. If there is no direct threat, such elites embrace even dramatic 
organisational change relatively easily – even though this may mean more rules and 
paperwork or even a complete overhaul of the “management culture”. It would not be 
surprising if future studies revealed that international civil servants accept change 
much more easily and more rapidly than their counterparts at national level. That is 
good news for potential organisational reformers, because resistance to change 
seems to have “objective” causes which should be open to positive manipulation 
through clever designs. Moreover, against the background of the importance Public 
Administration analyses give to organisational elites, their particular staff seems to 
equip international bureaucracies with an essential resource for playing an 
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autonomous role in international governance. It is thus not only time to discover 
international public bureaucracies as a new field of study (Trondal et al. 2010), but 
international bureaucratic elites, in particular, merit more systematic attention if our 
aim is to provide an adequate understanding of bureaucratic motivation in the 
emerging system of multilevel governance. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 5: Total Commission Staff by Various Staff Categories  
 
   staffing % of total staff 
Commission staff 
I. Officials (survey target 
population) 
 23 024 56.35,% 
II. Temporary agents   1 998 4.89% 
III. Contract agents   6 040 14.78% 
IV. Special advisors   57 0.14% 
V. Local agents   3 087 7.56% 
VI. National law contracts   230 0.56% 
VII. Trainees   1 600 3.92% 
Subtotal (Commission staff)   36 036 88.20% 
External staff 
VIII. Seconded National Experts 
(SNE)  
 1 164 2.85% 
IX. Service providers   3 002 7.35% 
X. Interim staff   657 1.61% 
Subtotal (external staff)   4 823 11.80% 
 Total   40 859 100.00% 
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Note: data as of December 31, 2009. Source: HR Report 2010 (European Commission 2010: 9) 
 
 
 
Table 6: Factor analysis 
Factor analysis/correlation  Number of Observations = 707 
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors = 1 
Rotation: (unrotated)  Number of Params = 7 
       
Factor      Eigenvalue    Difference         Proportion    Cumulative   
Factor1         3.47455 2.58536 0.4964 0.4964   
Factor2        0.88920 0.09048 0.1270 0.6234   
Factor3        0.79871 0.13606 0.1141 0.7375   
Factor4         0.66265 0.18459 0.0947 0.8322   
Factor5         0.47806 0.10069 0.0683 0.9005   
Factor6         0.37737 0.05793 0.0539 0.9544   
Factor7         0.31945 . 0.0456 1.0000   
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(21) = 1662.40 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
       
       
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances   
Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness      
         
personalefficiency 0.7212 0.4799     
personalcosts 0.5028 0.7472     
unitefficiency 0.8127 0.3395     
managementfocus 0.7387 0.4543     
resources     0.7336 0.4618     
formalisticreform 0.7332 0.4624     
administrativeload 0.6478 0.5803      
 
Table 7: Screen Plot 
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Table 8: Independent Variables: Coding 
 
Approach Variable Hypothesis Data Source Coding 
Opportunity 
hypotheses 
H1 Middle manager The higher the rank, the 
greater the reform 
acceptance 
EUCIQ 20: What is your 
current position? 
1=middle 
manager, 0=other 
H2 Senior manager The higher the rank, the 
greater the reform 
acceptance 
EUCIQ 20: What is your 
current position? 
1=senior 
manager, 0=other 
H3 DG Type Working for a DG with an 
internal budget and 
administrative power 
leads to greater reform 
acceptance 
EUCIQ 116: Which is your 
current Directorate-
General/service? 
1=DG Budget, 
DG Admin, 
Internal Audit 
Service, 
Secretariat-
General, 0=all 
others 
H4 Career 
prospects 
If there is a perception of 
recent unfair career 
management within the 
Commission, then low 
reform acceptance 
EUCIQ 160: The 
consequences of 
enlargement for career 
development have been 
handled with equity and 
fairness. 
0=very fair, 1= 
somewhat fair, 
2=neither nor, 
3=somewhat 
unfair, 4=very 
unfair 
Socialisation 
hypotheses 
H5 Administrative 
traditions 
Individuals from NPM 
forerunner countries like 
the reform, those from 
NPM laggards dislike the 
reform  
Cluster: UK, Scandinavia, 
East I = NPM forerunner, 
EU South (GR, F, ES) 
East II = NPM laggards 
(according to 
Pollitt/Bouckaert 2004) 
1=laggards, 
0=NPM 
forerunners 
H6 Experience in 
private sector 
Work experience in the 
private sector should lead 
to greater reform 
EUCIQ 10: Work 
experience outside the 
Commission 
1=yes, 0=no 
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acceptance 
H7 Economists Education in economics 
should lead to greater 
reform acceptance 
EUCIQ 7: Education –
main degree subject 
1=economics, 
0=other subjects 
EU-Ideology 
hypotheses 
H8 
Supranationalism 
Supranationalists should 
exhibit lower reform 
acceptance 
EUCIQ 128: Some argue 
that member states – not 
the Commission or 
European Parliament – 
should be the central 
players in the European 
Union. What is your 
position? 
0=strong 
intergovernmental
ist, 1=somewhat 
intergovernmental
ist, 2=neither nor, 
3=somewhat 
supranationalist, 
4=strong 
supranationalist 
H9 Entrepreneur Those who see the goal 
of the Commission in 
entrepreneurship for 
integration should exhibit 
low reform acceptance 
EUCIQ 132: The more 
member states the EU 
has, the more important is 
the Commission‟s role as 
a policy initiator 
0=strongly 
disagree 
entrepreneur, 
1=sw disagree 
entrepreneur, 
2=neither nor, 
3=sw agree 
entrepreneur, 
4=strongly agree 
entrepreneur 
H10 EU idealism EU idealists should 
exhibit low reform 
acceptance 
EUCIQ 2_4 reasons for 
joining the European 
Commission 
1= commitment to 
Europe, 0=other 
reason 
Control 
Com Power Loss 1 Those who see the 
Commission as losing out 
politically should exhibit 
low reform acceptance 
EUCIQ 224: The 
Commission is more 
powerful today than ever 
before 
0=agree, 1=agree 
somewhat, 
2=neither nor 
3=disagree 
somewhat, 
4=disagree 
Lawyers, Political 
Scientists and 
Engineers 
Education in law, political 
science and engineering 
should lead to lower 
reform acceptance 
EUCIQ 7: Education – 
main degree subject 
1=law, politics or 
engineering, 
0=other subjects 
Length of service The longer the length of 
service, the lower the 
reform acceptance 
EUCIQ 4: Year of entry to 
the Commission 
Years of service 
Age  EUCIQ 123: What is your 
year of birth? 
Years 
Female  EUCIQ 124: What is your 
gender? 
1=female, 0=male 
 
